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If a person takes an action, she cannot prefer to take another action instead. This fun-
damental idea is called “revealed preference” in choice theory or “incentive compatibility” in
game theory. Often a person’s payoﬀ, and hence her chosen action, depends on probabilistic
events she cannot control, such as the weather or the actions of others. Thus her action,
and the payoﬀ she receives, can be considered random variables. This paper shows that in-
centive compatibility implies that when a person chooses among two actions, conditional on
these two actions, her action is nonnegatively correlated with the payoﬀ diﬀerence between
the two actions. This simple result has implications in a wide variety of contexts, includ-
ing individual choice under uncertainty, strategic form games, and incomplete information
games. This result is shown in a general context, independent of any assumption about
prior beliefs, communication and coordination devices, incomplete information, or whether
the randomness is due to exogenous events or the endogenous actions of other people or
both. This result shows how revealed preference or incentive compatibility constraints have
an immediate “statistical” interpretation.
In the context of strategic form games, this result has several implications. For example,
in a two person game in which one person’s payoﬀs are quadratic, one can predict the sign
of the covariance of people’s actions in any correlated equilibrium of the game. In a local
interaction game, one can predict the sign of the covariance between a person’s action and
the number of neighbors who take the same action. For 2 × 2 games, observing a signed
covariance in people’s actions is suﬃcient to identify pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
game. For incomplete information games, the result yields testable empirical predictions
which hold for any assumption about prior beliefs or the kind of incomplete information and
which do not require computing an equilibrium. This paper starts with deﬁnitions and the
main result, considers several examples, and concludes by discussing the merits of “statistical
game theory.”
Deﬁnitions and main result
We have a standard framework. A person chooses x from a ﬁnite set X but does not
choose y, which belongs to a ﬁnite set Y . For example, y might be determined by exogenous
randomness, the choices of other people who have their own motivations, or both. Her utility
function is given by u : X × Y → <. Let p : X × Y → < be a probability distribution over
1X ×Y , in other words p(x,y) ≥ 0 for all (x,y) ∈ X ×Y and
P
(x,y)∈X×Y p(x,y) = 1. Let U
be the set of all utility functions on X×Y and let P be the set of all probability distributions
on X × Y .






p(x,y)u(x0,y) for all x,x0 ∈ X. (IC)
The idea here is that when the person plays x, the probability distribution over Y is given
by p(x,y), and her expected utility is
P
y∈Y p(x,y)u(x,y). If she plays x0 instead, then
her payoﬀs change but the resulting probability distribution over Y does not change (since
she cannot control y), and hence she gets expected utility
P
y∈Y p(x,y)u(x0,y). The IC
constraint says that she cannot gain by doing so. Let IC(u) be the set of probability
distributions p which satisfy IC given u, and let IC(p) be the set of utility functions u
which satisfy IC given p. It is easy to see that IC(u) and IC(p) are convex sets. It is easy
to see that ¯ u ∈ IC(p), where ¯ u is deﬁned as ¯ u(x,y) = 0 for all x,y, and hence IC(p) 6= ∅. We
know that IC(u) 6= ∅ by for example Hart and Schmeidler (1989) and Nau and McCardle
(1990). We say that u is trivial if IC(u) = P, in other words, if every probability distribution
satisﬁes IC.
We can think of X ×Y as a probability space with probability distribution p. A random
variable is a function deﬁned on X × Y . Given some subset Z ⊂ X × Y , we deﬁne the
“indicator function” 1Z : X × Y → < as 1Z(x,y) = 1 if (x,y) ∈ Z and 1Z(x,y) = 0
otherwise. If x ∈ X, for convenience we write 1x instead of 1{x}×Y , and similarly if y ∈ Y ,
we write 1y instead of 1X×{y}. We deﬁne x : X ×Y → X as x(x,y) = x and y : X ×Y → Y
as y(x,y) = y. In this paper, we use boldface to indicate random variables.
Given p and a real-valued random variable f : X × Y → <, the expectation of f is
Ep(f) =
P
(x,y)∈X×Y p(x,y)f(x,y). Given Z ⊂ X × Y , we write p(Z) =
P
(x,y)∈Z p(x,y).
Given Z ⊂ X × Y such that p(Z) > 0, the conditional expectation of f is Ep(f|Z) =
(
P
(x,y)∈Z p(x,y)f(x,y))/p(Z). The covariance of two real-valued random variables f and g
is covp(f,g) = Ep(fg) − Ep(f)Ep(g), and the conditional covariance covp(f,g|Z) is deﬁned
similarly. For convenience, if p(Z) = 0, we write covp(f,g|Z) = 0. Note that for random
variables f,g,g0 and real numbers α,α0 ∈ <, we have covp(f,αg + α0g0) = αcovp(f,g) +
α0covp(f,g0).
2The probability distribution p can be understood in a few diﬀerent ways. Since the
person controls x ∈ X but not y ∈ Y , one might instead think of the person as choosing a
conditional probability distribution r(x|y), where y has an exogenous probability distribution
q(y) over Y . We use p(x,y) because it is simpler and mathematically equivalent (although it
is not exactly equivalent, since one might say that r(x|y) should be well-deﬁned even when
q(y) = 0). Another interpretation is that p is the result of a possibly quite complicated
messaging and information mechanism by which the person learns and updates beliefs about
y ∈ Y ; for example, the person might receive some signal which is correlated with y, she
might receive an explicit message from another person about what y is, or she might know
something about y directly. Regardless of how p occurs, if p violates IC then the person is
not maximizing her expected payoﬀ, since it is always possible for the person, whenever he
chooses x, to choose x0 instead (see for example Myerson 1991 on the “revelation principle”).
Finally, p can be understood simply as the observed histogram of the person’s actions over
some time period. We might not know why the person’s actions along with exogenous or
endogenous randomness result in the histogram p, but we can surely say that whenever she
chose x, she could have chosen x0 instead, and thus she could not have gained by doing so.
The IC constraints can thus be understood as revealed preference inequalities.
Our main result is a signed conditional covariance. Given incentive compatibility, then
conditional on two choices x and x0, the random variable which indicates when the per-
son plays x and the random variable which is the payoﬀ diﬀerence between x and x0 are
nonnegatively correlated.
Proposition. Say p,u satisfy IC and x,x0 ∈ X. Then
covp(1x,u(x,y) − u(x0,y)|{x,x0} × Y ) ≥ 0.
This result is obtained by manipulating two IC constraints: the constraint that when the
person chooses x, she cannot do better by playing x0, and when the person chooses x0, she
cannot do better by playing x. The proof is in the appendix. Note that the IC constraints
are linear in p while the covariance in the Proposition is quadratic in p; in other words, the
Proposition is not a linear restatement of the IC constraints.
Since the Proposition is based on only the IC constraints, it holds under very weak
conditions. Again, the IC constraints hold regardless of any assumption about how the
3person might or might not have knowledge about y. The IC constraints do not involve
any assumption about how exactly p(x,y) comes about. The IC inequalities are minimal
requirements for individual rationality: whenever the person chooses x, she could have chosen
x0 instead, and the fact that she did not means that she could not have gained by doing so.
The 2 × 2 case
To illustrate the Proposition, we take the simplest nontrivial case, when X = {x,x0}




The Proposition says that if p,u satisfy IC, then the two random variables 1x and u(x,y)−









For these two random variables to have nonnegative covariance, it must be that when 1x is
high, u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is high; roughly speaking, it must be that p(x,y) and p(x0,y0) are
large compared with p(x,y0) and p(x0,y).

















The ﬁrst distribution p is what results if y occurs with probability 0.6 and y0 occurs with
probability 0.4, and the person knows exactly when either y or y0 occurs, and makes his
optimal choice accordingly. The second distribution p0 is consistent with a situation in
which the person gets a noisy signal about whether y or y0 occurs; the signal is correct
often enough so that the person still chooses x if the signal indicates y and x0 if the signal
indicates y0. The third distribution p00 is consistent with the person not knowing anything
about y or y0; since y is more likely than y0, the person is best oﬀ choosing x all the time.
4All three distributions p,p0,p00 satisfy IC, and in all three distributions, the covariance of
1x and u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is nonnegative (positive in p and p0 and zero in p00). In the last
distribution p000, the covariance of 1x and u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is negative, and it is easy to
see that IC is violated: regardless of the beliefs behind the person’s choice and what he
knows about y or y0, he violates rationality because all the times that he chooses x and gets
expected utility (0.1)8 + (0.3)3 = 1.7, he could choose x0 instead and get a higher expected
utility (0.1)0 + (0.3)7 = 2.1.
In the 2 × 2 case, we have two simple facts.
Fact 1. Say X = {x,x0} and Y = {y,y0} and u is nontrivial. Then either covp(1x,1y) ≥ 0
for all p ∈ IC(u) or covp(1x,1y) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ IC(u).
In other words, as long as u is nontrivial (that is, P 6= IC(u)), then we can sign the covariance
of x and y in all incentive compatible p. Fact 1, proved in the appendix, follows immediately
from the Proposition: the Proposition signs the covariance of 1x and u(x,y) − u(x0,y), but
when Y has only two elements, u(x,y)−u(x0,y) is a linear function of 1y and hence we can
sign the covariance of 1x and 1y. Fact 2 follows immediately from Fact 1.
Fact 2. Say X = {x,x0} and Y = {y,y0} and u is nontrivial. Say p,p0 ∈ IC(u). If
covp(1x,1y) > 0, then covp0(1x,1y) ≥ 0. If covp(1x,1y) < 0, then covp0(1x,1y) ≤ 0.
In other words, say that we observe p and then try to identify incentive compatible u. Once
we have done this, it is natural to then make a prediction based on what has been learned
about u. In the 2 × 2 case, this could not be simpler. If one observes for example positive
covariance between x and y, in any utility function u consistent with this observation, in any
incentive compatible p0 of any such utility function, one must have nonnegative covariance
(assuming the utility function is not trivial). In other words, if we observe signed covariance,
we can predict that in future behavior, the covariance cannot have the opposite sign. We can
make this prediction without knowing or assuming anything else about the utility function
(other than that it is nontrivial).
5Quadratic payoﬀs
Say X ⊂ < and Y ⊂ <m; in other words, x ∈ X is a real number and y = (y1,...,ym) ∈
Y is a vector of real numbers. When the utility function u is quadratic in x and yi (actually,
when it satisﬁes a somewhat weaker condition), we can sign the weighted sum of covariances
between x and the various yi. The proof of Fact 3 is in the appendix.
Fact 3. Say that X ⊂ <, Y ⊂ <m and u satisﬁes the condition that u(x,y) − u(x0,y) =
v(x,x0)
Pm
j=1 cjyj + w(x,x0), where cj ∈ < and v(x,x0) > 0 when x > x0. Say p,u satisfy
IC. Then
Pm
j=1 cj covp(x,yj) ≥ 0.
For example, say that X,Y ⊂ < and u is quadratic: u(x,y) = kxyxy + kxxx2 + kyyy2 +
kxx + kyy + k0, where kxy,kxx,kyy,kx,ky,k0 ∈ <; we can think of kxy as the “interaction
term.” It is easy to see that this utility function satisﬁes the condition in Fact 3: set
c1 = kxy, v(x,x0) = x − x0 and w(x,x0) = kxx(x2 − (x0)2) + kx(x − x0). Fact 3 says that
kxy covp(x,y) ≥ 0. Thus we have three conclusions. First, if kxy 6= 0, we can predict the sign
of the covariance of x and y. Second, if we observe a positive covariance, we can conclude
that kxy ≥ 0. Third, say that we observe a signed covariance. We can predict that in any
utility function consistent with this observation, in any behavior consistent with any such
utility function, the covariance must have the same sign. We make this prediction knowing
nothing else about the utility function, other than assuming it is quadratic and kxy 6= 0.
It is easy to explain how the proof works. The Proposition signs the covariance between
1x and the utility diﬀerence u(x,y)−u(x0,y) conditional on {x,x0}×Y . When the condition
in Fact 3 is satisﬁed, the utility diﬀerence u(x,y)−u(x0,y) is a weighted sum of the various
yj, and thus we can sign the weighted sum of covariances between 1x and the various
yj conditional on {x,x0} × Y . It is not hard to show (Lemma 3 in the appendix) that
the unconditional covariance covp(x,yj) can be obtained by summing up the conditional
covariances covp(x,yj|{x,x0} × Y ) over x,x0 ∈ X. Hence we can sign the weighted sum of
unconditional covariances.
For an example which is not quadratic, say u(x,y1,y2) = 5x1/2y1 − 3x1/2y2 + 4y1y2 +
6(y1 − y2)2 − 7x3/2. By Fact 3, we have 5covp(x,y1) − 3covp(x,y2) ≥ 0.
6Odds ratios
We can also think in terms of “odds ratios.” Note that the person does not control y
and hence cannot determine the absolute levels of p(x,y) and p(x0,y), for example. However,
the person is in control of x, and can determine the odds ratio p(x,y)/p(x0,y). One might
think that if p,u satisfy IC, then the ratio p(x,y)/p(x0,y) should be higher when the payoﬀ
diﬀerence u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is higher. This is not true: the ratio does not always increase in
the payoﬀ diﬀerence. However, we can make a weaker statement: Fact 4 says that the odds
ratio cannot always decrease in the payoﬀ diﬀerence.
Fact 4. Say that p,u satisfy IC and x,x0 ∈ X. Say that u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is not constant in
y and that p(x0,y) > 0 for y ∈ Y . The following statement is not true:
u(x,y) − u(x0,y) > u(x,y0) − u(x0,y0) ⇔ p(x,y)/p(x0,y) < p(x,y0)/p(x0,y0).
The proof is in the appendix, but it is easy to explain how it works. By the Proposition,
we know that the person’s action and his payoﬀ diﬀerence are nonnegatively correlated. If x
is always played less often relative to x0 when the payoﬀ diﬀerence is higher, then we would
have a negative correlation.
Say X,Y ⊂ <. If u(x,y) − u(x0,y) strictly increases in y for all x > x0, then u is called
strictly supermodular. If p(x,y)/p(x0,y) strictly increases in y for all x > x0, then p is called
strictly totally positive of order 2 (Karlin and Rinott 1980a; Milgrom and Weber 1982 use
the term “aﬃliated”). If p(x,y)/p(x0,y) strictly decreases in y for all x > x0, then p is
called strictly reverse rule of order 2 (Karlin and Rinott 1980b). From Fact 4, if payoﬀs u
are strictly supermodular, then p is not necessarily strictly totally positive of order 2, but
cannot be strictly reverse rule of order 2. Similarly, if p is strictly totally positive of order 2,
then u need not be strictly supermodular, but −u cannot be strictly supermodular.
Choice under uncertainty
To illustrate our results in the context of choice under uncertainty, consider a simple
example of a paparazzo and a celebrity. The paparazzo is a photographer who wants to
get as close as possible to the celebrity, whose location changes each day. Let x ∈ X be
the photographer’s location and y ∈ Y be the celebrity’s location, where X,Y ⊂ <. An
appropriate utility function for the paparazzo is u(x,y) = −(x − y)2.
7If the paparazzo always knows the celebrity’s location y, he chooses x = y, which maxi-
mizes u(x,y). But the celebrity might wear disguises, the paparazzo might try to cultivate
informants, the celebrity might try to create false rumors, and so forth, in a rather compli-
cated process. The standard way to predict which location the paparazzo chooses on a given
day, however, is quite straightforward: we simply specify the paparazzo’s prior belief over
Y of the celebrity’s location on that day, and then we ﬁnd the x ∈ X which maximizes the
paparazzo’s expected payoﬀ given this belief.
This paper’s approach does not require specifying any beliefs. We write u(x,y) = −x2+
2xy − y2. Since the coeﬃcient on the xy term is 2, by Fact 3 we have 2covp(x,y) ≥ 0
and hence covp(x,y) ≥ 0. In other words, we predict that the paparazzo’s location and
the celebrity’s location are nonnegatively correlated. If the paparazzo always knows the
celebrity’s exact location, then x = y and their locations are perfectly positively correlated.
If the paparazzo never knows anything about the celebrity’s location and thus always goes
to the middle of town, their locations have zero correlation. What cannot happen is for the
paparazzo’s location and the celebrity’s location to be negatively correlated. This prediction
holds for any prior belief, for any speciﬁcation of how the paparazzo gains information or
disinformation, and for any probability distribution of the celebrity’s actual location. This
prediction holds regardless of the deﬁnition of X ⊂ < and Y ⊂ <, for example whether
the elements of X and Y are bunched together or evenly spread out. This prediction holds
regardless of whether the celebrity consciously chooses his location or whether his location
is determined exogenously by his shooting schedule. This prediction holds regardless of the
celebrity’s motivations, whether the celebrity despises and actively avoids the paparazzo, is
indiﬀerent or unaware, or in fact enjoys having his picture taken. This prediction is based
only on the paparazzo’s utility function and the incentive compatibility constraints.
Note that by Fact 3, this prediction holds even if the paparazzo’s utility function has the
form u(x,y) = v(x)+w(y)−(x−y)2, where v(x) is a function only of x and w(y) is a function
only of y. For example, the paparazzo might prefer locations in his own neighborhood, or
prefer that the celebrity be in a location with good natural light. The essential aspect of the
utility function which drives the result is the negative coeﬃcient −2 on the xy term.
Now make the situation slightly more complicated. Say the celebrity’s talent agency hires
a security thug to harass paparazzi. As before, the paparazzo chooses a location x ∈ X ⊂ <,
but now has to think about the celebrity’s location y1 and the security thug’s location
8y2, where y = (y1,y2) ∈ Y ⊂ <2. Say that the paparazzo’s utility function is u(x,y) =
−(x − y1)2 + k(x − y2)2, where k ≥ 0 is a parameter indicating how much the paparazzo
worries about the security thug. The paparazzo wants to be close to the celebrity but far
from the security thug. We can write u(x,y) = −x2 +2xy1 −y2
1 +kx2 −2kxy2 +ky2
2. Hence
by Fact 3 we know 2covp(x,y1) − 2kcovp(x,y2) ≥ 0 and thus covp(x,y1) ≥ k covp(x,y2).
This prediction is easy to interpret. If the paparazzo pursues the celebrity and avoids the
security thug, we have covp(x,y1) ≥ 0 and covp(x,y2) ≤ 0, and this is possible regardless
of how large k is. It is impossible to have covp(x,y1) < 0 and covp(x,y2) > 0; it can never
be that the paparazzo and celebrity negatively covary and the paparazzo and the security
thug positively covary. If covp(x,y1) and covp(x,y2) are both positive, then covp(x,y1) must
be suﬃciently high; the more the paparazzo worries about the security thug, the higher k
is, and the higher covp(x,y1) must be to make the harassment risk worthwhile. Finally,
if covp(x,y1) and covp(x,y2) are both negative, then again covp(x,y1) must be suﬃciently
high. For small k, it cannot be that the paparazzo’s covariance with the security thug
is slightly negative but his covariance with the celebrity is very negative; by avoiding the
security thug he cannot pay too high a price in terms of celebrity access. As k increases, the
paparazzo tolerates greater avoidance of the celebrity in order to avoid the security thug.
Some special cases are interesting. If covp(x,y2) = 0, then we have the same prediction
as before, covp(x,y1) ≥ 0; if the paparazzo and security thug are uncorrelated, we can think
of this as the security thug imposing a dead-weight cost on the paparazzo which is the same
whatever the paparazzo does and therefore does not aﬀect his decision. If the security thug
and celebrity are always together, then covp(x,y1) = covp(x,y2). Hence if k < 1, we must
have covp(x,y1) ≥ 0; the security thug is not a suﬃcient deterrent. If k > 1, the security
thug is scary enough and we have covp(x,y1) ≤ 0.
We can also identify k given observed behavior. As mentioned above, if covp(x,y1) ≥ 0
and covp(x,y2) ≤ 0, then there is no restriction on k. If we observe covp(x,y1) < 0 and
covp(x,y2) > 0, this is impossible and thus we must reject our utility function. If covp(x,y1)
and covp(x,y2) are both positive, we can conclude that k ≤ covp(x,y1)/covp(x,y2). If the
paparazzo covaries weakly with the celebrity but strongly with the security thug, then k
must be small; the paparazzo must not care much about the security thug since he doesn’t
mind covarying with him even for a low reward. If covp(x,y1) and covp(x,y2) are both
negative, we conclude that k ≥ covp(x,y1)/covp(x,y2). If the paparazzo covaries strongly
9negatively with the celebrity and weakly negatively with the security thug, then k must be
large, since the paparazzo pays a high price avoiding the celebrity just to slightly avoid the
security thug.
Again, all of the conclusions here are robust, independent of any assumption about
prior beliefs, the motivations of the celebrity and security thug and whether they choose
consciously or not, whether they purposefully coordinate their locations or not, how the
paparazzo learns about the celebrity and security thug, the deﬁnitions of X and Y , and so
forth. The only assumptions here are the paparazzo’s utility function itself and incentive
compatibility. This robustness is nice for making predictions but especially desirable for
identiﬁcation. Our restrictions on k above hold under extremely weak assumptions and thus
are almost unarguable. Our restrictions on k are also easy to compute and understand; ﬁnd-
ing restrictions on k using a more standard approach, involving assumptions about beliefs,
utility “shocks” and error terms, would be much more complicated.
Strategic form games
In the standard ﬁnite strategic form game, we have a ﬁnite set of people N = {1,...,n},
each with a ﬁnite strategy set Ai and each with a utility function ui : A → <, where
A = ×i∈NAi. To put a strategic form game in our framework, for each player i ∈ N we
simply let X = Ai, Y = A−i, and u = ui, where A−i = ×j∈Nr{i}Aj. We thus have a set of
constraints ICi for each person i. A probability distribution p which satisﬁes ICi for all i ∈ N
is called a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974). As is well known, any distribution over A
resulting from a pure strategy or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, or convex combination
of Nash equilibria, is a correlated equilibrium. We deﬁne the random variable ai : A → Ai
as ai(a) = ai. Given a game u, we say CE(u) is the set of correlated equilibria.
Consider the example 2 × 2 games below. In the ﬁrst game, “chicken,” given u1 and
the resulting IC constraints for person 1, we conclude using Fact 1 that covp(a1,a2) ≤ 0.
Given u2 and the resulting IC constraints for person 2, we conclude using Fact 1 that
covp(a2,a1) ≤ 0. Hence we have covp(a1,a2) ≤ 0 for all correlated equilibria p of this game.
Similarly we conclude that covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0 for all correlated equilibria p of the second game,





















In the third game, “matching pennies,” given u1 and the resulting IC constraints for person
1, we conclude using Fact 1 that covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0. Given u2 and the resulting IC constraints
for person 2, we conclude using Fact 1 that covp(a2,a1) ≤ 0. Hence covp(a1,a2) = 0 for
all correlated equilibria p of this game. In this game the unique correlated equilibrium is
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, in which people’s actions are chosen independently
and hence have zero covariance. In the fourth game, the correlated equilibria are those
distributions which place weight only on (1,0) and (1,1), since for person 1 action 0 is
strongly dominated. Since there is no variation in person 1’s action, the covariance between
their actions is zero. In the ﬁfth game, both u1 and u2 are trivial and CE(u) = P, that is,
every distribution is a correlated equilibrium.
To identify 2 × 2 games, it turns out that a signed covariance is suﬃcient to identify a
game’s pure strategy Nash equilibria. In other words, if one observes a nonzero covariance
between two people’s actions in a 2 × 2 game, we need not care if their actions result from
pure strategy Nash equilibria, mixed strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, or a
mixture of all of these. The signed covariance itself is enough to locate pure Nash equilibria,
knowing nothing else about the game. The proof of Fact 5 is in the appendix.
Fact 5. Say n = 2, A1 = {a1,b1}, A2 = {a2,b2}, and p ∈ CE(u). If covp(1a1,1a2) > 0, then
(a1,a2) and (b1,b2) are Nash equilibria of u. If covp(1a1,1a2) < 0, then (a1,b2) and (b1,a2)
are Nash equilibria of u.
After identifying a 2 × 2 game to the extent possible given observations, what can we
predict? From Fact 2, if we observe for example positive covariance in some correlated
equilibrium, in any such game consistent with this observation, in any correlated equilibrium
of any such game, we can predict nonnegative covariance (as long as the game is nontrivial).
In other words, observing a signed covariance is enough to make predictions about future
play in the game, without knowing anything else about the game or assuming anything other
than nontriviality.
11For an example of a three-person game, consider the following “Three Player Matching









The Proposition says that cov(a1,u1(1,a2,a3) − u1(0,a2,a3)) ≥ 0 in any correlated
equilibrium. In this game, u1(1,a2,a3) − u1(0,a2,a3) = −2(1 − a2)(1 − a3) + 2a2a3 =
−2+2a2+2a3. Since −2 is a constant, we have cov(a1,2a2+2a3) ≥ 0 and thus cov(a1,a2)+
cov(a1,a3) ≥ 0. Similarly, we ﬁnd that cov(a1,a2) + cov(a2,a3) ≥ 0. We also know that
cov(a3,u3(a1,a2,1)−u3(a1,a2,0)) ≥ 0 and that u3(a1,a2,1)−u3(a1,a2,0) = 4(1−a1)(1−
a2)−4a1a2 = 4−4a1−4a2. Thus cov(a1,a3)+cov(a2,a3) ≤ 0. So we have three inequalities
on the three covariances cov(a1,a2), cov(a1,a3), and cov(a2,a3). From these inequalities,
we conclude that cov(a1,a2) is nonnegative and either cov(a1,a3) or cov(a2,a3) or both are
nonpositive for all correlated equilibria.
Now consider games with quadratic utility functions. Quadratic utility functions are
often found in applications, for example Cournot oligopoly games with linear demand func-
tions and quadratic costs (see Liu 1996 and Yi 1997 on the uniqueness of correlated equilibria
in Cournot oligopoly games and Neyman 1997 on potential games generally). Any game in
which best response functions are linear (see for example Manski 1995, p. 116) is naturally
represented with quadratic utility functions. Fact 3 says that if a single player has a quadratic
utility function, for example u1(a1,a2) = k12a1a2 + k11(a1)2 + k22(a2)2 + k1a1 + k2a2 + k0,
then we can conclude that k12 covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0 for all correlated equilibria of the game. This
is true regardless of person 2’s utility function. So assuming that person 1 has a quadratic
utility function and k12 6= 0, we have three results. If k12 > 0, we predict a nonnegative
covariance. If we observe positive covariance, we conclude k12 > 0. If we observe a positive
covariance, in all games consistent with this observation, in any correlated equilibrium of
any such game, we must have nonnegative covariance.
For another example, say that n = 3, u1(a1,a2,a3) = a1a3−a1a2−(a1)2, u2(a1,a2,a3) =
a1a2 − a2a3 − (a2)2, and u3(a1,a2,a3) = −(a2 − a3)2. By Fact 3, we know that
cov(a1,a3) − cov(a1,a2) ≥ 0, cov(a1,a2) − cov(a2,a3) ≥ 0, and 2cov(a2,a3) ≥ 0. Thus
12we can conclude that cov(a1,a2), cov(a1,a3), and cov(a2,a3) are all nonnegative in any
correlated equilibrium.
Games with incomplete information
In the standard ﬁnite game with incomplete information, we have a ﬁnite set of people
N = {1,...,n} and a ﬁnite state space Ω. Each person i ∈ N has a ﬁnite strategy set Ai, a
prior belief πi on Ω, a utility function ui : A × Ω → <, and a partition Pi of Ω representing
what she knows about the world. Person i’s strategy is deﬁned as a function fi : Ω → Ai
which is measurable with respect to Pi, and equilibrium is deﬁned in the standard way. A
common example is to say that each person has a “type” in Ti and that each person only
knows her own type; in this case Ω = ×i∈NTi and Pi = {{ti} × T−i}ti∈Ti, and a person’s
strategy can be thought of as a function from Ti to Ai.
To put a game with incomplete information into our framework, for each person i ∈ N
we let X = Ai, Y = A−i × Ω, and u = ui. We thus have a set of constraints ICi for each
person i. The probability distribution p on A × Ω is called a mechanism or mediation plan
(see for example Myerson 1991), and a mediation plan which satisﬁes ICi for all i ∈ N is
called an incentive compatible mediation plan. As is well known, in any equilibrium of the
incomplete information game, the resulting distribution over A×Ω is an incentive compatible
mediation plan. In addition, any equilbrium behavior given any kind of communication
device or information sharing results in an incentive compatible mediation plan. Note that
Y = A−i × Ω and there is no distinction necessary between the actions of other players and
exogenous uncertainty.
Here we use a Cournot oligopoly example to contrast our signed covariance approach with
the standard equilibrium approach. Say ﬁrm 1 produces quantity q1 and ﬁrm 2 produces q2,
and given these quantities, the market price is 60 − (q1 + q2). Firm 1 has a unit production
cost of s1 and ﬁrm 2 has a unit production cost of s2; these costs randomly vary. Their payoﬀs
are thus given by u1(q1,q2) = (60−q1−q2)q1−s1q1 and u2(q1,q2) = (60−q1−q2)q2−s2q2.
How do the ﬁrm quantities q1,q2 depend on each other and on the costs s1,s2? The
standard way to answer this question is to model the situation as an incomplete information
game and ﬁnd equilibria. Because of the uncertainty about costs s1,s2, we must specify the
ﬁrms’ prior beliefs on s1,s2 and what they know about s1,s2.
13The simplest case is when the costs s1,s2 are common knowledge, even though they
randomly vary. With a bit of calculation, we ﬁnd equilibrium quantities q∗
1 = 20+s2/3−2s1/3
and q∗
2 = 20 + s1/3 − 2s2/3. This is true regardless of ﬁrms’ prior beliefs; beliefs are not an
issue here since s1,s2 are always common knowledge. If we let s1,s2 take on values 0, 6, and
12, the equilibrium quantities q∗
1,q∗




0 0 20 20
0 6 22 16
0 12 24 12
6 0 16 22
6 6 18 18
6 12 20 14
12 0 12 24
12 6 14 20
12 12 16 16
How do the results in this table compare with results from our approach? We can write
u1(q1,q2) = 60q1−(q1)2−q2q1−s1q1, and thus Fact 3 says that −covp(q1,q2)−covp(q1,s1) ≥
0 for any incentive compatible p. Thus covp(q1,q2) + covp(q1,s1) ≤ 0. In other words,
either covp(q1,q2) or covp(q1,s1) or both must be nonpositive. Similarly for ﬁrm 2, we get
covp(q1,q2) + covp(q2,s2) ≤ 0.
Note that in the ﬁrst three rows of the table above, s1 does not vary. Thus if (s1,s2)
is distributed only among these three rows, we have covp(q1,s1) = 0 and thus we must
have covp(q1,q2) ≤ 0, which is what we observe in the ﬁrst three rows: as q1 increases, q2
decreases. Note that covp(q1,q2) > 0 is possible, for example if (s1,s2) is distributed only
among (0,0),(6,6),(12,12), the ﬁrst, ﬁfth, and last row of the table. In this case, covp(q1,s1)
and covp(q2,s2) must both be negative, which is what we see in the table.
Now consider the case when ﬁrm 1 knows only s1 but ﬁrm 2 knows both s1 and s2.
Now we must specify the ﬁrms’ prior beliefs: assume that s1 and s2 are distributed among
0,6,12, and each of the nine possible states of the world occurs with probability 1/9. We
can compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as shown in the table below. Note that q∗
1 does




0 0 22 19
0 6 22 16
0 12 22 13
6 0 18 21
6 6 18 18
6 12 18 15
12 0 14 23
12 6 14 20
12 12 14 17
How do the results in this table compare with our approach? In this equilibrium,
and given our prior belief that each state occurs with probability 1/9, we compute
covp(q1,q2) = −16/3, covp(q1,s1) = −16 and covp(q2,s2) = −12, consistent with our
results that covp(q1,q2) + covp(q1,s1) ≤ 0 and covp(q1,q2) + covp(q2,s2) ≤ 0.
Finally, consider the case when ﬁrm 1 only knows s1 and ﬁrm 2 only knows s2. Prior




0 0 21 21
0 6 21 18
0 12 21 15
6 0 18 21
6 6 18 18
6 12 18 15
12 0 15 21
12 6 15 18
12 12 15 15
How do the results in this table compare with our approach? In this equilibrium, and
given our prior beliefs, we ﬁnd covp(q1,q2) = 0, covp(q1,s1) = −12 and covp(q2,s2) = −12,
again consistent with our results that covp(q1,q2) + covp(q1,s1) ≤ 0 and covp(q1,q2) +
covp(q2,s2) ≤ 0.
In these three cases, computing equilibria is not diﬃcult, and the equilibria of course
provide more precise predictions than the signed covariances. But more complicated sce-
narios exist. What if the costs s1 and s2 are correlated? What if whether a ﬁrm knows
its own or the other ﬁrm’s cost depends on what exactly the cost is? What if the ﬁrms
communicate their costs to each other with noise? What if the ﬁrms employ a mediator
15which recommends actions to take? What if the ﬁrms condition their actions on some com-
monly observed external signal? What if the ﬁrms do not have a common prior on s1,s2?
What if the costs s1,s2 are manipulated by some third party with its own objectives? For
each possible scenario, we would have to specify explicitly the prior beliefs, the incomplete
information, how the mediator sends signals, and so forth, and ﬁnd one or more equilibria
which predict how q1,q2 depend on s1,s2.
The signed covariance approach makes less precise predictions. But it applies to all the
scenarios above, including all possible prior beliefs, all possible speciﬁcations of incomplete
information, all possible mediation and communication systems, and so forth. By using
the IC constraints directly, we can make predictions which hold for all possible scenarios,
without any assumptions other than incentive compatibility and the utility function itself.
Another incomplete information game often studied (see Bresnahan and Reiss 1991,
Tamer 2003) is below, where u1,u2 are considered random “utility shocks.”
0 1
0 0,0 0,x2β2 − u2
1 x1β1 − u1,0 x1β1 + ∆1 − u1,x2β2 + ∆2 − u2
We have covp(a1,(x1β1−u1)(1−a2)+(x1β1+∆1−u1)a2) ≥ 0 from the Proposition. But
covp(a1,(x1β1 −u1)(1−a2)+(x1β1 +∆1 −u1)a2) = −covp(a1,u1)+∆1 covp(a1,a2). Thus
we have ∆1 covp(a1,a2) ≥ covp(a1,u1). Similarly we have ∆2 covp(a1,a2) ≥ covp(a2,u2).
Thus if covp(a1,a2) > 0, we conclude that ∆1 ≥ covp(a1,u1)/covp(a1,a2) and ∆2 ≥
covp(a2,u2)/covp(a1,a2).
Thus we can bound ∆1,∆2 simply by computing covariances. In terms of prediction,
we can similarly bound covp(a1,a2); for example if ∆1,∆2 have diﬀerent signs, we have an
upper and lower bound for covp(a1,a2). We make these conclusions without any assumption
about the distributions of u1,u2, the values of x1,β1,x2,β2, what each person knows about
the realizations of u1,u2, whether the people can talk to each other, and so forth.
16Linear combinations of games
Sometimes it is convenient to express payoﬀs in a game as the linear combination of
payoﬀs from several simpler games. For example, DeNardo (1995) surveys expert and student
preferences over whether the United States and Soviet Union should build weapons systems
such as the MX missile, and ﬁnds that the great variety of preferences are understandable
as convex combinations of certain “strategic extremes” such as the “Pure Dove” and the
“Strong Hawk,” shown below (the payoﬀs here are the US’s payoﬀs).
SU builds SU doesn’t
US builds 1 1
US doesn’t 1 4
Pure Dove
SU builds SU doesn’t
US builds 3 4
US doesn’t 1 2
Strong Hawk
Here the Pure Dove prefers for neither side to build the weapon, and any side building
the weapon is equally bad. For the Strong Hawk, US superiority is most preferred, both
having the weapon is second best, and the worst is for the US to not have the weapon
while the Soviet Union does. Let α be the weight given to Pure Dove and 1 − α be the
weight given to Strong Hawk, where α ∈ [0,1]. Say the US is person 1 and the Soviet
Union is person 2. Say that building is strategy 1 and not building is strategy 0. In
Pure Dove, u1(1,a2) − u1(0,a2) = −3(1 − a2). In Strong Hawk, u1(1,a2) − u1(0,a2) = 2.
Hence in the game which is a convex combination of Pure Dove and Strong Hawk, we have
covp(a1,a2) = αcovp(a1,−3(1−a2))+(1−α)covp(a1,2) ≥ 0. Thus we get 3αcovp(a1,a2) ≥ 0.
If α > 0, we know covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0. If α = 0, in any correlated equilibrium, the US always
builds and hence covp(a1,a2) = 0. Regardless of what α is, and regardless of the Soviet
Union’s payoﬀs, we can conclude that the US and SU actions are nonnegatively correlated.
For another example, say that we observe people playing a 2×2 game. We do not know
exactly which game they are playing: possibly chicken, battle of the sexes, matching pennies,
or some mixture of the three. Say that the game is a convex combination, with chicken having













1 − α − β
17From the Proposition, we have αcovp(a1,1 − 2a2)) + β covp(a1,−2 + 3a2) + (1 − α −
β)covp(a1,−1 + 2a2) ≥ 0. Hence (2 − 4α + β)covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0. From the Proposition we
also have αcovp(a2,1 − 2a1)) + β covp(a2,−1 + 3a1) + (1 − α − β)covp(a2,1 − 2a1) ≥ 0.
Hence (5β − 2)covp(a1,a2) ≥ 0. Thus if we observe a positive covariance, we can conclude
that β ≥ 2/5 and α ≤ 3/5. If we observe a negative covariance, we can conclude that
β ≤ 2/5 and α ≥ 3/5. In other words, a positive covariance indicates that the battle of
the sexes “component” is relatively large, while a negative covariance indicates that it is
relatively small. This result is intuitive and straightforward, and indeed the question here
of estimating α and β given observations should be a simple one. The standard method of
ﬁnding equilibria requires a much more complicated random utility model.
Local interaction games
A local interaction game can be thought of as each person playing the same 2 × 2 game
with each of his neighbors (see for example Young 1998 and Morris 2000). For each person
i ∈ N, let Ai = {0,1} and let N(i) ⊂ N be person i’s neighbors (we assume i 6∈ N(i)).
Payoﬀs are deﬁned as ui(a) =
P
j∈N(i) vi(ai,aj).
The Proposition says that
P
j∈N(i) covp(ai,vi(1,aj) − vi(0,aj)) ≥ 0. But we know
vi(1,aj)−vi(0,aj) = (vi(1,0)−vi(0,0))(1−aj)+(vi(1,1)−vi(0,1))aj = vi(1,0)−vi(0,0)+
[vi(0,0) − vi(1,0) + vi(1,1) − vi(0,1)]aj. Since vi(1,0) − vi(0,0) is a constant, we have
[vi(0,0) − vi(1,0) + vi(1,1) − vi(0,1)]covp(ai,
P
j∈N(i) aj) ≥ 0.
Thus in any local interaction game, given the neighborhood N(i) and the payoﬀs vi, we
can sign the covariance between a person’s action and the sum of his neighbors’ actions, as
long as vi(0,0)−vi(1,0)+vi(1,1)−vi(0,1) 6= 0. For example, if vi is a coordination game, with
Nash equilibria (0,0) and (1,1), it must be that person i’s action is nonnegatively correlated
with the sum of her neighbors’ actions. Going in the other direction, given observed actions
and the neighbors N(i) of person i, we can sign vi(0,0)−vi(1,0)+vi(1,1)−vi(0,1). Given
observed actions and payoﬀs vi, we can identify possible sets of neighbors N(i).
On October 1, 3, and 5, 2001, I collected data on whether people in census tract 7016.01
(in Santa Monica, California) displayed ﬂags on their residences, as shown in Figure 1. A
plus sign indicates a residence which displays a United States ﬂag or some other red, white,
and blue decoration; a dot indicates a residence which does not. There are 1174 total
residences in the data set, which is available from the author. The residences in this census
18tract are primarily single-family homes, although 93 buildings in my data set are multi-unit
buildings such as townhouses or apartment buildings. A data point here is an individual
building; for example, when a ﬂag appears on an apartment building, the entire building
is counted as displaying a ﬂag and no attempt is made to ﬁgure out which apartment in
the building is displaying the ﬂag and which ones are not. Only residential buildings are
included. According to the 2000 US Census, 3957 people live in this census tract and there
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Figure 1. Flag display in census tract 7016.01
(Santa Monica, California), October 1, 3, 5, 2001
19In my data, 362 of the 1174 residences (30.8 percent) display ﬂags. Inspecting Figure 1,
it seems that a person’s choice of whether to display a ﬂag depends on whether her neighbors
display a ﬂag; for example, there are some blocks in which nearly everyone displays a ﬂag,
which would be unlikely if people’s decisions were independent.
We can model this as a local interaction game, where putting up a ﬂag is strategy 1
and not putting up one is strategy 0, and payoﬀs are v(0,0),v(0,1),v(1,0),v(1,1) (assume
these payoﬀs are the same for everyone). Let N(i), the neighbors of i, be the houses on the
same block adjacent to i. In our data, 947 of the 1174 residences have two neighbors in this
sense, 220 have one neighbor, and 7 have no neighbors. We ﬁnd that covp(ai,
P
j∈N(i) aj) =
(250/1174) − (362/1174)(655/1174) ≈ 0.0409; in other words, the covariance between a
person’s action and the actions of his neighbors is positive. Hence v(0,0)−v(1,0)+v(1,1)−
v(0,1) ≥ 0. Since both strategy 1 and strategy 0 are observed, we assume that neither is
strongly dominated, and hence we conclude that v(0,0) ≥ v(1,0) and v(1,1) ≥ v(0,1), or in
other words, v is a coordination game with two pure Nash equilibria (0,0) and (1,1).
To identify v(0,0),v(0,1),v(1,0),v(1,1) more precisely, we can directly use the IC in-
equalities. Of the residences which put up ﬂags, on average 250/362 ≈ 0.691 of their neigh-
bors also put up ﬂags and 405/362 ≈ 1.119 of their neighbors do not put up ﬂags. Hence we
have the inequality (250/362)v(1,1)+(405/362)v(1,0) ≥ (250/362)v(0,1)+(405/362)v(0,0).
Of the residences which do not put up ﬂags, on average 405/812 ≈ 0.499 of their neighbors
put up ﬂags and 1054/812 ≈ 1.298 of their neighbors do not put up ﬂags. Hence we have
the inequality (405/812)v(0,1) + (1054/812)v(0,0) ≥ (405/812)v(1,1) + (1054/812)v(1,0).
We can normalize v(0,1) = v(1,0) = 0; assuming that v(0,0) 6= 0, we can also normalize
v(0,0) = 1. We thus have v(1,1) ∈ [405/250,1054/450] ≈ [1.620,2.342]. Note that if we
assume Nash equilibrium instead of the IC inequalities, we cannot identify the magnitude
of v(1,1) because any positive v(1,1) is consistent with (1,1) being a Nash equilibrium.
We might suppose a more complicated model; for example a person’s immediate neigh-
bors might aﬀect her payoﬀ more than people who live two houses away. Say that
person i has immediate neighbors N(i) and peripheral neighbors NN(i). Say that a
person gets payoﬀs v(0,0),v(0,1),v(1,0),v(1,1) from immediate neighbors and payoﬀs
vv(0,0),vv(0,1),vv(1,0),vv(1,1) from peripheral neighbors, and assume for convenience
that v(0,1) = v(1,0) = vv(0,1) = vv(1,0) = 0. So if a person puts up a ﬂag and one
of her immediate neighbors and two of her peripheral neighbors put up ﬂags, she gets
20payoﬀ v(1,1) + 2vv(1,1) for example. From the Proposition, we know that (v(0,0) +
v(1,1))covp(ai,
P
j∈N(i) aj) + (vv(0,0) + vv(1,1))covp(ai,
P
j∈NN(i) aj) ≥ 0. Let N(i) again
be the houses on the same block adjacent to i and let NN(i) be the houses on the same block
two houses away from i on either side. In the data, we have covp(ai,
P
j∈N(i) aj) ≈ 0.0409 and
covp(ai,
P
j∈NN(i) aj) ≈ 0.0278. Thus 0.0409(v(0,0)+v(1,1))+0.0278(vv(0,0)+vv(1,1)) ≥
0. This it cannot be that both v and vv are “anticoordination” games (games in which (0,1)
and (1,0) are the pure Nash equilibria). If we assume v(0,0) = v(1,1) and vv(0,0) = vv(1,1)
for simplicity, we have 0.0409v(0,0) + 0.0278vv(0,0) ≥ 0. If vv is an anticoordination game
with vv(0,0) = −1, then v must be at least a “weak” coordination game with v(0,0) ≥ 0.680.
If v is an anticoordination game with v(0,0) = −1, then vv must be a relatively “strong”
coordination game with vv(0,0) ≥ 1.471.
Conclusion: statistical game theory
The most common solution concepts in game theory and choice theory are “point” pre-
dictions which predict a single action for each person, as in Nash equilibrium. However, when
we analyze data, we typically look not at each particular data point by itself but at the sta-
tistical relationships among diﬀerent variables given all the data. This paper works toward a
“statistical game theory” which makes predictions given a game, and identiﬁes games given
data, fundamentally in terms of statistical relationships. This paper demonstrates a relation-
ship between the fundamental game-theoretic concept of incentive compatibility (revealed
preference in choice-theoretic terms) and the fundamental statistical concept of covariance.
Most work on applying games to empirical data is based on point predictions such as
Nash equilibrium. Thus explaining observed variation requires adding exogenous random-
ness or heterogeneity, for example by allowing random mistakes or by allowing payoﬀs in a
game to vary randomly (for example Bresnahan and Reiss 1991, Lewis and Schultz 2003,
McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, Signorino 2003, Tamer 2003). This paper shares the motivations
of this literature, and as explored in earlier examples, has direct application for example to
models with random utilities. This paper, however, derives statistical relationships not from
randomness added on to a game but from what is inherent in the game itself, assuming
nothing more than incentive compatibility.
There are three advantages to using incentive compatibility constraints instead of a point-
prediction approach. First, since the set of incentive compatible distributions is convex, any
21aggregation of incentive compatible distributions is also incentive compatible. For example, if
each group of individuals in a population is playing an incentive compatible distribution, or if
each play in a sequence of trials is an incentive compatible distribution, then the distribution
aggregated over the population or over the sequence is incentive compatible. One need not
worry about whether a given observation is an individual or aggregate, since they can be
treated in the same way. This is not usually true for point predictions; for example, the set
of Nash equilibria is not convex.
Second, the assumptions here are much weaker than the assumptions behind Nash equi-
librium. All Nash equilibria of any game, including games of incomplete information, satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraints, and all of the results in this paper still hold if we
more traditionally assume Nash equilibria and their mixtures. If people play a mixture of
several pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria, instead of ﬁguring out how this
mixture can result from the various Nash equilibria, we can simply use the mixture directly
and calculate covariances to identify the game.
Third, typically the existence of multiple equilibria is considered a shortcoming which
needs to be somehow ﬁxed. For example, when applying games to empirical data, because of
multiple equilibria, the distribution of equilibria cannot be exactly determined by assump-
tions about how the game is distributed (see for example Tamer 2003). There has been
much work in game theory developing criteria for selecting one of several equilibria. The
statistical approach here completely avoids this issue, and considers not one but all possible
incentive compatible distributions. The statistical approach is concerned not with any single
predicted action but with statistical relationships among actions; a wide range of possible
actions is something to be embraced, not avoided.
Incentive compatibility is a fundamental concept, and since it is deﬁned as a set of linear
inequalities, it is mathematically simple compared to Nash equilibrium for example, which
is the ﬁxed point of a correspondence. However, even people familiar with the concept
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to intuitively “visualize,” even in the simplest case of a 2 × 2 game (see
Nau, Gomez-Canovas, and Hansen 2004 and Calv´ o-Armengol 2003). This paper shows how
incentive compatibility can be understood in “reduced form” as a signed covariance.
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24Appendix
To prove the Proposition, we ﬁrst deﬁne φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) and derive two lemmas. Given
p ∈ P and (x,y),(x0,y0) ∈ X ×Y , deﬁne φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) = p(x,y)p(x0,y0)−p(x,y0)p(x0,y).
Lemma 1 says that the incentive compatibility constraints imply a linear inequality on
φ((x,y),(x0,y0)).
Lemma 1. If p,u satisfy IC, then
P
y∈Y (u(x,y) − u(x0,y))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) ≥ 0.
Proof. We write IC as
P
y∈Y p(x,y)(u(x,y) − u(x0,y)) ≥ 0. Multiplying both sides by
p(x0,y0), we have
P
y∈Y p(x,y)p(x0,y0)(u(x,y) − u(x0,y)) ≥ 0. We call this inequality (∗).
Similarly, we have the IC inequality
P
y∈Y p(x0,y)(u(x0,y)−u(x,y)) ≥ 0. Multiplying both
sides by p(x,y0), we have
P
y∈Y p(x,y0)p(x0,y)(u(x0,y)−u(x,y)) ≥ 0. We call this inequality
(∗∗). Add the inequalities (∗) and (∗∗) together and we are done. 
Lemma 2 says that the covariance of two random variables is a linear function of the
φ((x,y),(x0,y0)). Lemma 2 is well known (see for example C. M. Fortuin, P. W. Kasteleyn,
and J. Ginibre 1971), but we state and prove it here for the sake of completeness. We say a
random variable f : X × Y → < is constant in y if f(x,y) = f(x,y0) for all x ∈ X, y,y0 ∈ Y .
We say a random variable g : X × Y → < is constant in x if g(x,y) = g(x0,y) for all
x,x0 ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Lemma 2. Say that f : X × Y → < is constant in y and g : X × Y → < is constant in
x. Say that Z = X0 × Y 0, where X0 ⊂ X, Y 0 ⊂ Y , and p(Z) > 0. Then covp(f,g|Z) =
[1/(4p(Z)2)]
P
(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) − g(x0,y0))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)).
Proof. Let k =
P
(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) − g(x0,y0))p(x,y)p(x0,y0). We ex-









p(Z)2[Ep(fg|Z) − Ep(f|Z)Ep(g|Z) − Ep(f|Z)Ep(g|Z) + Ep(fg|Z)] = 2p(Z)2covp(f,g|Z). Let
there be a one-to-one function m : X0 → {1,2,...,#X0} which assigns a unique number







(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z:m(x)=m(x0))(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) − g(x0,y0))p(x,y)p(x0,y0). The third
sum is zero because f is constant in y and m(x) = m(x0) implies x = x0.
25If we let (v,w) = (x0,y) and (v0,w0) = (x,y0), then the second sum can be written as
P
(v,w),(v0,w0)∈Z:m(v)>m(v0) −(f(v,w) − f(v0,w0))(g(v,w) − g(v0,w0))p(v0,w)p(v,w0), because f
is constant in y and g is constant in x. Changing variables again, where (x,y) = (v,w) and
(x0,y0) = (v0,w0), the second sum is
P
(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z:m(x)>m(x0)(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) −
g(x0,y0))(−p(x0,y)p(x,y0)). Thus k =
P
(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z:m(x)>m(x0)(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) −
g(x0,y0))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) = (1/2)
P
(x,y),(x0,y0)∈Z(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) − g(x0,y0))
φ((x,y),(x0,y0)). Since k = 2p(Z)2covp(f,g|Z), we are done. 
Proposition. Say p,u satisfy IC and x,x0 ∈ X. Then
covp(1x,u(x,y) − u(x0,y)|{x,x0} × Y ) ≥ 0.
Proof. If p({x,x0}×Y ) = 0, we are done, by our convention that covp(f,g|Z) = 0 if p(Z) = 0.




It suﬃces to show that this sum is nonnegative.
From Lemma 1, we know that
P
y∈Y (u(x,y) − u(x0,y))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) ≥ 0. Hence
P
y,y0∈Y (u(x,y) − u(x0,y))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) ≥ 0. Call this inequality (∗). From the
deﬁnition of φ((x,y),(x0,y0)), we have φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) = −φ((x0,y),(x,y0)). Hence
P
y,y0∈Y −(u(x,y) − u(x0,y))φ((x0,y),(x,y0)) ≥ 0. If we change variables and let y0 = y and
y = y0, we have
P
y,y0∈Y −(u(x,y0)−u(x0,y0))φ((x0,y0),(x,y)) ≥ 0. Since φ((x0,y0),(x,y)) =
φ((x,y),(x0,y0)), we have
P
y,y0∈Y −(u(x,y0) − u(x0,y0))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) ≥ 0. Call this in-
equality (∗∗). Add (∗) and (∗∗) together and we are done. 
Fact 1. Say X = {x,x0} and Y = {y,y0} and u is nontrivial. Then either covp(1x,1y) ≥ 0
for all p ∈ IC(u) or covp(1x,1y) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ IC(u).
Proof. By the Proposition, we have covp(1x,u(x,y) − u(x0,y)) ≥ 0. It is easy to ver-
ify that u(x,y) − u(x0,y) = (u(x,y) − u(x0,y))1y + (u(x,y0) − u(x0,y0))(1 − 1y). Hence
covp(1x,(u(x,y)−u(x0,y))1y +(u(x,y0)−u(x0,y0))(1−1y)) = (u(x,y)−u(x0,y)−u(x,y0)+
u(x0,y0))covp(1x,1y) ≥ 0. If u(x,y)−u(x0,y)−u(x,y0)+u(x0,y0) 6= 0, we are done. Assume
u(x,y) − u(x0,y) − u(x,y0) + u(x0,y0) = 0. If u(x,y) > u(x0,y), then u(x,y0) > u(x0,y0)
26and thus IC implies p(x0,y) = p(x0,y0) = 0, and thus covp(1x,1y) = 0. Similarly,
if u(x,y) < u(x0,y), we have covp(1x,1y) = 0. Thus we are left with the case when
u(x,y) = u(x0,y), and thus u(x,y0) = u(x0,y0), in which case u is trivial. 
To prove Fact 3, we need Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Say that X ⊂ < and that f : X × Y → < is constant in y and g : X × Y → < is
constant in x. Then covp(f,g) =
P
x,x0∈X,x>x0 p({x,x0} × Y )2covp(f,g|{x,x0} × Y ).
Proof. By Lemma 2, we have covp(f,g) = (1/4)
P








Since f is constant in y, the second sum is zero. Show that the ﬁrst sum and the third
sum are equal. If we change variables (x = x0 and x0 = x), the third sum is
P
x0<x(f(x0,y)−
f(x,y0))(g(x0,y) − g(x,y0)) φ((x0,y),(x,y0)). Since φ((x0,y),(x,y0)) = −φ((x,y),(x0,y0)),
the third sum is
P
x0<x(f(x,y0)−f(x0,y))(g(x0,y)−g(x,y0))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)), which is equal
to the ﬁrst sum since f is constant in y and g is constant in x. Hence covp(f,g) =
(1/2)
P
x>x0(f(x,y) − f(x0,y0))(g(x,y) − g(x0,y0))φ((x,y),(x0,y0)).
By Lemma 2, covp(f,g|{x,x0} × Y ) = [1/(4p({x,x0} × Y )2)]
P







x>x0 p({x,x0} × Y )2covp(f,g|{x,x0} × Y ). 
Fact 3. Say that X ⊂ <, Y ⊂ <m and u satisﬁes the condition that u(x,y) − u(x0,y) =
v(x,x0)
Pm
j=1 cjyj + w(x,x0), where cj ∈ < and v(x,x0) > 0 when x > x0. Say p,u satisfy
IC. Then
Pm
j=1 cj covp(x,yj) ≥ 0.
Proof. By the Proposition, we know that covp(1x,v(x,x0)
Pm
j=1 cjyj+w(x,x0)|{x,x0}×Y ) ≥
0. Since v(x,x0) > 0 and w(x,x0) are constants, we have covp(1x,
Pm
j=1 cjyj|{x,x0} × Y ) ≥
0. Hence when x > x0, we have covp(x,
Pm





x>x0 p({x,x0}× Y )2covp(x,
Pm
j=1 cjyj|{x,x0}× Y ) ≥ 0. Hence
Pm
j=1 cj covp(x,yj) = covp(x,
Pm
j=1 cjyj) ≥ 0. 
27Fact 4. Say that p,u satisfy IC and x,x0 ∈ X. Say that u(x,y) − u(x0,y) is not constant in
y and that p(x0,y) > 0 for y ∈ Y . The following statement is not true:
u(x,y) − u(x0,y) > u(x,y0) − u(x0,y0) ⇔ p(x,y)/p(x0,y) < p(x,y0)/p(x0,y0).
Proof. We know
P
y,y0∈Y [(u(x,y)−u(x0,y))−(u(x,y0)−u(x0,y0))]φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) ≥ 0 from
the proof of the Proposition. If the statement in Fact 4 is true, then (u(x,y) − u(x0,y)) −
(u(x,y0)−u(x0,y0)) > 0 ⇔ p(x,y)/p(x0,y) < p(x,y0)/p(x0,y0) ⇔ φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) < 0. Since
u(x,y)−u(x0,y) is not constant in y, it must be that
P
y,y0∈Y [(u(x,y)−u(x0,y))−(u(x,y0)−
u(x0,y0))]φ((x,y),(x0,y0)) < 0, a contradiction. 
Fact 5. Say n = 2, A1 = {a1,b1}, A2 = {a2,b2}, and p ∈ CE(u). If covp(1a1,1a2) > 0, then
(a1,a2) and (b1,b2) are Nash equilibria of u. If covp(1a1,1a2) < 0, then (a1,b2) and (b1,a2)
are Nash equilibria of u.
Proof. By the Proposition, we have covp(1a1,u1(a1,a2)−u1(b1,a2)) ≥ 0. It is easy to verify
that u1(a1,a2)−u1(b1,a2) = (u1(a1,a2)−u1(b1,a2))1a2+(u1(a1,b2)−u1(b1,b2))(1−1a2), and
thus covp(1a1,(u1(a1,a2)−u1(b1,a2))1a2 +(u1(a1,b2)−u1(b1,b2))(1−1a2)) = (u1(a1,a2)−
u1(b1,a2) − u1(a1,b2) + u1(b1,b2))covp(1a1,1a2) ≥ 0. Thus if covp(1a1,1a2) > 0, we have
u1(a1,a2)−u1(b1,a2)−u1(a1,b2)+u1(b1,b2) ≥ 0. It cannot be that person 1 has a strongly
dominated strategy (because then covp(1a1,1a2) = 0) and thus u1(a1,a2) ≥ u1(b1,a2) and
u1(b1,b2) ≥ u1(a1,b2). We show u2(a1,a2) ≥ u2(a1,b2) and u2(b1,b2) ≥ u2(b1,a2) similarly.
If covp(1a1,1a2) < 0, the argument is similar. 
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